Political Parties (Part One): Machiavelli, Cicero and Modern Political Psychology

(This article presents personal research, a review of relevant literature, and my hypotheses. It includes links to all sources used, but it has not been “peer-reviewed” itself. I am posting it to provoke thought and further research.)

Almost 12 years ago, I published an essay about Machiavelli’s statements concerning political parties. I thought at the time that his observations were the most insightful I’d come across. Since then, I’ve discovered that Cicero made similar observations about political factions in the Roman Republic. And I think I see similar political groupings in modern republics. What’s behind this social phenomenon? I believe recent discoveries in political psychology provide an answer.

(Graphic by “Vic”)

Niccolo Machiavelli discussed political parties in two of his works, The Prince and Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius:

[from The Prince, CHAPTER IX]
“But coming to the other point — where a leading citizen becomes the prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence, but by the favour of his fellow citizens — this may be called a civil principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a principality is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the favour of the nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there arises in cities one of three results, either a principality, self-government, or anarchy.”

[from Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius, CHAPTER IV.]
“…while in every republic there are two conflicting factions, that of the people and that of the nobles, it is in this conflict that all laws favourable to freedom have their origin, as may readily be seen to have been the case in Rome.”

It turns out that Machiavelli was not the first to perceive two such parties or factions in political life. Centuries earlier, Marcus Tullius Cicero had made similar observations concerning the prominent political factions in the Roman Republic.

XLV. There have always in this city been two kinds of men who have been ambitious of being concerned in affairs of state, and of arriving at distinction by such a course; and of these two kinds one wish to be considered popular men, and the others wish both to be, and to be considered, of the party of the best men in the state. Those whose object it was that whatever they did and whatever they said should be agreeable to the multitude, were the popular party; but those who conducted themselves in such a way as to induce all the best men to approve of their counsels, were considered of the best party. THE SPEECH OF M. T. CICERO IN DEFENCE OF PUBLIUS SEXTIUS

In the original speech, Cicero referred to the “popular” party as “Populares,” and to the party of the “best men” as “Optimates.”

Modern scholars reportedly see the Optimates as having been the “traditionalist,” “conservative” faction, which “opposed the extension of Roman citizenship and sought the preservation of the mos maiorum, the ways of their forefathers.” Their opponents, the Populares faction, sought to support the urban poor, provide debt relief and redistribute land. Sound familiar?

Of course, these were not political parties in the sense they exist today, with charters, bylaws and dues. Nevertheless, they were distinct social groups with conflicting political goals, just like modern political parties.

You can see these same political divisions at other points in history. The following political cartoon was reportedly published in France in 1789, the year of the French Revolution:

[Source]

Here the clergy and the aristocracy — the French “optimates” of their day — are depicted as riding on the backs of the Third Estate, the common people — or “populares.” The phrase beneath has been translated as, “You should hope that this game will be over soon.” It was.

A similar division can be seen in the opposing sides of the Spanish Civil War. The war appears to have begun after a government formed by the Popular Front — the “populares” — enacted laws that stripped away privileges enjoyed by the Catholic Church, forced early retirement upon many military officers, legislated wage increases and nationalized some land. Obviously, these measures antagonized the Catholic clergy, military leaders, industrialists and large landowners — the “optimates” of Spain in 1936 — and they revolted against the government.

Machiavelli and Cicero didn’t try to explain why these factions had appeared in medieval Florence or ancient Rome. It was simply obvious that some people defended the status quo, with its hierarchies and cultural traditions, and they formed a political group to accomplish this. Other people challenged the status quo, with its hierarchies and traditions, and they formed political groups to achieve their objectives. But why have similar things happened at different times and in different places? What’s behind this recurring social phenomenon?

I first addressed this question in the essay “Deeper into the Psyches of Conservatives & Liberals.” I was curious to know why we have different, even opposing, political orientations. I discovered that recent research in political psychology and neuroscience had provided some answers:

• Psychologists Carney, Jost et al. asserted that there is “consistent and converging evidence" that Liberals and Conservatives have significant personality differences. The results of 88 studies conducted in 12 countries supported Psychologist Glenn D. Wilson’s theory, that the Conservative personality is significantly associated with a “generalized susceptibility to experiencing threat or anxiety in the face of uncertainty,” and “conservative attitudes serve a defensive function.” (p. 261)
• Jost et al. similarly concluded that Conservative resistance to change and acceptance of inequality were ultimately rooted “in psychological attempts to manage uncertainty and fear.” Social change presents uncertainty, which creates anxiety in Conservatives. Conservatives react by resisting social change and defending the status quo. Social equality presents uncertainty with regard to status. To avoid status anxiety, Conservatives resist egalitarianism and defend inequality. Moreover, the status quo usually includes inequality, so defending the status quo usually includes defending inequality on that basis, as well. You can see how this Defensive disposition informs Conservative attitudes with regard to immigration, religion, race, gender, Obamacare and other issues. Changes to the status quo create uncertainty, uncertainty creates anxiety, and Conservatives react to this anxiety by reflexively defending the status quo ante.
• Liberals also experience anxiety under conditions of uncertainty, but Liberals tend to respond by activating brain processes which mitigate their initial reactions. Presumably this is why Jost et al. found that Liberals were strongly associated with Openness to Experience and traits related to it: sensation-seeking, novelty-seeking, curiosity, creativity, and rebelliousness. It would also explain why Liberals advocate for social change and challenge inequality: through cognitive intervention, Liberals experience less uncertainty anxiety than Conservatives.
• Ryota Kanai et al. conducted MRI brain scans of 90 individuals who self-reported their political attitudes (“very liberal” to “very conservative”). They found that “increased gray matter volume in the anterior cingulate cortex was significantly associated with liberalism,” and that “increased gray matter volume in the right amygdala was significantly associated with conservatism.” They did a replication study with 28 more subjects and obtained similar results. They noted that one function of the amygdala concerns the processing of fear, and people with large amygdala have been found to be more sensitive to fear. On the other hand, one function of the anterior cingulate cortex is to monitor uncertainty. Kanai et al. therefore cautiously hypothesized that people with larger amygdala would be more inclined to conservative views, and people with larger ACCs, having “a higher capacity to tolerate uncertainty and conflicts,” would “accept more liberal views.” Overall, Kanai et al. believed that these results were “consistent with the proposal that political orientation is associated with psychological processes for managing fear and uncertainty.”
• In The Neuroscience of Fair Play, Donald W. Pfaff provides numerous examples of how genes affect brain structure and chemistry, including those relating to fear. Nancy L. Segal provides further evidence of the influence of genes, based on twin studies and adoption studies, in her book, Entwined Lives. Dr. Segal estimates (p. 70) that “Approximately 20–50% of individual differences in personality are genetically based.”

Thus, there appear to be natural reasons why social groups commonly see the formation of two conflicting political factions. Some members of the group, at least partly for genetic reasons, will be more sensitive to conditions of uncertainty. That will dispose them to band together to conserve the status quo. Other members of the group, at least partly due to their genetic code, will be less sensitive to conditions of uncertainty. That will dispose them to band together to effect desired changes from the status quo. The names of these opposing political factions will vary from time to time and place to place, but the pattern permeates throughout. It is clearest in democracies, where political conditions permit voting by the general public. It’s less clear in autocratic or totalitarian states, where one of the factions is able to maintain one-party control (whether it’s autocracy or totalitarianism by the “Left” or the “Right”), but elements of the other faction will always be around, ready to rise when conditions permit.

We often say, in such circumstances, that the party opposing us is irrational, or failing to see their own interests. But it really comes down to the fact that the parties don’t have the same value priorities. People in these factions will undertake different social and political actions based on the differences in their value priorities. Their social and political calculations are, in this sense, value-rational. Thus, our social groups, while based on cooperation, also experience conflict and competition.

As an aside, this hypothesis fits nicely into Social Exchange Theory, which I discussed elsewhere in an essay titled “Evolutionary Social Exchange Theory.”

To be clear, I’m not suggesting there are just two kinds of people in the world. There appears to be a spectrum or range of political orientations, within which it is possible and common for people to form two opposing political factions [one at each end of the spectrum].

The evidence from modern political psychology also suggests there are discernible factions within these political factions. That will be the subject of my next essay.

Afternotes:

There are other views of the Liberal/Conservative divide.

Psychologist Jonathan Haidt has published a book, The Righteous Mind, in which he asserts that “Liberals” and “Conservatives” intuitively use different moral foundations: Liberals primarily use the moral foundations of care and fairness; Conservatives use the moral foundations of liberty, loyalty, authority and sanctity, as well as the moral foundations of care and fairness.

Anthropologist Avi Tuschman, author of Our Political Nature, asserts in his book that the “Left” and “Right” of the political orientation spectrum differ with respect to three personality traits: their attitude toward tribalism, their attitude toward inequality and their perception of human nature.

• Those on the Right, “conservatives,” score high on measures which he associates with “tribalism” -- ethnocentricity, religiosity and sexual intolerance. Those on the Left, “liberals,” score high associations with attraction to out-groups, secularism and sexual tolerance.
• Unlike those on the Left, those on the Right score high on measures indicating tolerance for power hierarchies and inequality.
• Those on the Right perceive human nature to be essentially competitive; those on the Left perceive human nature to be essentially cooperative. (I see this as deriving from their dispositions toward hierarchy and equality.)

Tuschman’s book is truly encyclopedic in scope, presents a wealth of supporting data, and is written in a comprehensible style. If I taught a course in political sociology, this would be the textbook!